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Radical innovation in Marshallian industrial districts 
 
Abstract: Radical innovation is under-researched in the geography of innovation strand and, it is very noticeably 
missing in that of industrial districts. In this paper, the focus is on understanding how radical innovations occur 
in Marshallian industrial districts (MIDs), a phenomenon mostly overlooked by scholars. This study theorizes 
upon industrial districts as a distinct socio-economic innovation system mostly based on incremental innovation 
and challenges this assumption. Using exploratory and in-depth longitudinal case study methodology in two 
European MIDs, covering from 1998-to-2015, this paper analyzes radical innovation in MIDs and finds that the 
introduction of technology-distant knowledge (to the MID) and the entrance of new firms from different (to the 
focal) industries  are both necessary mechanisms but not sufficient for radical innovation to occur. Access to 
leading incumbents’ networks, based on social norms, becomes a crucial social factor necessary for radical 
innovation to occur in MIDs.  
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1-Introduction 
As regards the literature of Marshallian industrial districts (MIDs), innovation has been mostly 
assumed under continuous or incremental innovation (Robertson and Langlois; 1995:558; 
Bianchi and Giordani, 1993:31), under-researching the occurrence of radical innovation. At 
most, the literature has merely described lock-in and cluster decline as opposed to disruption 
(e.g. Glasmeier, 1991; Grabher, 1993; Staber and Sautter, 2011; Ostergaard and Park, 2015) or 
explained why inertia restricts or prevents change (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Martin and 
Sunley, 2011), omitting the explanation of how radical innovation occurs in MIDs and how 
MIDs are transformed when successfully overcoming lock-in and inertia. The transition and 
rejuvenation of a MID, through a process of creative destruction or radical innovation, has not 
been covered yet in the MID literature, as explained below. Put differently, deciphering how 
radical innovation occurs and transforms MIDs is a new phenomenon in the MID literature.  
 
Specifically, this study addresses radical innovation focused on MIDs, being the latter a 
particular case of agglomerations where social capital plays a prominent role. We argue that 
the intrinsic socially-based characteristics of MIDs, based on strongly tied networks, mostly 
following a supplier-driven innovation pattern1 and embedded in local institutional structures 
that support a dynamic mix of cooperation and competition (e.g. Piore and Sabel, 1984), 
represent an unaddressed space from which to understand and frame radical innovation.  Hence, 
explaining how radical innovation occurs in MIDs constitutes this study’s goal.   In this study 
                                                          





radical innovation refers to technological discontinuities which incorporate new knowledge 
that destroys the value of incumbent systems and technologies in the marketplace (Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990), similar to the disruptive innovation term used by Christensen (1997) or 
creative destruction pointed out by Gilbert (2012). Thus, when applying the idea of radical 
innovation to MIDs, we are not referring just to an improvement or minor change: we mean 
that current specific technology or knowledge performed within a MID and embedded in its 
knowledge architecture becomes obsolete in contrast to new knowledge and technology that 
can be both created or adopted. This creative destruction is said to occur, for instance, in the 
advent of electronics in the Jura watch cluster in Switzerland and was an example for lock-in 
(see Glasmeier, 1991). Our paper, however, presents a theory and a case where radical 
innovation successfully occurred and rejuvenated an MID, transforming the entire world focal 
industry.  
Why has radical innovation in MIDs been studied less? In MIDs, existing networks 
orchestrated by leading incumbents are vital for ID functioning (Scott, 1989), in so far as they 
provide legitimacy to access tacit knowledge (Scott, 1992:16), Leading firms in MIDs are said 
to orchestrate knowledge and organize those networks (Munari et al., 2012; Lorenzoni and 
Lipparini, 1999) and avoid radical innovation in order to maintain their status quo and their 
central positions in the cluster’s networks (e.g., Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Allarakhia and 
Walsh, 2010), a fact in line with the above mentioned inertia or lock-in (e.g. Glasmeier, 1991; 
Grabher, 1993).  The point is that those local networks of small SMEs in MIDs, led by large 
and powerful leading firms that transfer knowledge in a supplier-driven pattern, only receive 
the type of knowledge that maintains leading firms’ centrality. That knowledge tends to prevent 
any major change in the existing local networks that may alter leading incumbents’ centrality, 
therefore avoiding disruptions and thus promoting inertia (Pouder and St. John, 1996). The 
main goal prevailing in those networks seems to be to maintain and protect leading firms’ status 
and centrality, and not to renew networks or clusters, presenting an interesting paradox. 
Moreover, the trust, repetitive inter-firm interactions and other social aspects make SMEs in 
those networks dependent of the leading knowledge-provider firm. Hence, MIDs and their 
specific strong-tied and socially-based networks of SMEs constitute a special setting where 
radical innovation does not frequently occur and for this reason that phenomenon has not been 
fully considered in the MID literature. For instance, Garofoli (1991) stresses that MIDs are 
better suited for gradual change rather than for disruption a fact supported empirically in both 






This study attempts to unfold and to shed light on this specific phenomenon, contributing to 
the geography of innovation. We ask the question: how does radical innovation occur in MIDs? 
To this end, and given the gap in the current theory of MIDs, we use an exploratory longitudinal 
case study research based on the analysis of two leading intertwined industrial districts in 
Europe. The focal process is radical innovation in MIDs, as above defined, and the setting is 
the Castellon2 ceramic tile (Spain) industrial district and its firms. Apart from that, we also 
studied the Sassuolo MID (Italy), due to the fact that both MIDs are intertwined and most 
innovation in both places has occurred due to their interconnections (see Hervas-Oliver and 
Boix, 2013). Those settings are chosen because both IDs underwent a process of radical 
innovation very recently with different outcomes. Our study and method are both justified by 
the fact that, although we observe that the study of MIDs and innovation are ubiquitous, yet 
the vast geography of MIDs in fact has not explained the occurrence of radical innovation, its 
mechanisms, processes, actors and effects.   
 
2- Intersecting MIDs and radical innovation: a review of the literature 
2-1 Radical knowledge in MIDs: how overcoming inertia? 
As abovementioned, innovation in MIDs is supposed to be based on continuous or incremental 
innovation based on local knowledge. The excessive reliance on the combination of existing 
local knowledge, however, and a manifested reluctance to change brings lock-in in 
agglomerations (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Maskell and Malmberg, 2007; Ostergaard and Park, 
2015; Hervas-Oliver, 2016). Glasmeier (1991) describes this phenomenon on the advent of the 
new wristwatch technology in the Jura region in Switzerland. In this case, leading incumbents 
did not show any inclination to switch to new electronic technologies.  As Glasmeier 
(1991:478) states: “…industry leaders were often skeptical about the viability of new 
proposals, particularly if they implied a radical reorientation”. Sull (2001) offers a similar 
description referring to the Akron tire cluster in Ohio, detailing how the cluster evolved from 
a community of innovation to a community of cognitive inertia and showing how the cluster 
was unable to change to the new radial tire technology developed by the French competitor 
Michelin, a fact also manifested in other works (e.g. Pouder and St. John 1996). Leading firms 
in MIDs are said to orchestrate knowledge and organize networks (Munari et al., 2012; 
Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) and avoid radical innovation in order to maintain their status 
                                                          





quo and their central positions in the cluster’s networks (e.g., Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; 
Allarakhia and Walsh, 2010), a fact in line with the above mentioned inertia or lock-in (e.g. 
Grabher, 1993; Sull, 2001).   
 
Firms, however, can avoid competency traps by searching outside their technological 
boundaries and by exploring in novel technology-distant areas (Rosenkpof and Nerkar, 2001) 
a fact also pointed out in districts and clusters (e.g. Eisingerich et al., 2010). Also, Menzel and 
Fornahl (2010:231) refer to the importance of openness to new technology-distant knowledge 
by pointing out that there is a need for the introduction of knowledge from “outside the 
thematic focus of the cluster” in order for creative destruction in geographic clusters to occur. 
Lastly, Gilbert (2012:738) states that  in order to occur radial innovation needs knowledge from 
other industries, that is,  technology-distant knowledge not available in the ID that usually is 
set by other different (to the focal) local industries. 
 
2-2 New firms and incumbents interplay: battle or alliance?  
 
At the MID level, the entrance of new firms has been seen as an indicator of cluster renewal 
and improvement (e.g. Eisingerich et al., 2010). Leading on from Gilbert (2012:734), leading 
incumbent cluster firms are generally described as being ‘caught off guard’ when new 
paradigms emerge in the marketplace (Glasmeier, 1991), since the capabilities demonstrated 
by new firms can turn the incumbents’ capabilities into core rigidities (Henderson, 1993). There 
is no doubt that new entrants are the quintessential driver of the cluster renewal (Saxenian, 
1990). In order to diffuse new knowledge, new firms may also need to access established 
networks led by incumbents. The existing value chain tends to favour the incumbents and 
constrain new challengers (Teece, 1986).  This implies that incumbents cannot respond to 
radical innovations due to their commitments to current value networks and technological 
paradigms, giving new entrants an advantage (Henderson, 1993). On the contrary, new entrants 
need complementary assets to commercially exploit the innovation3 (Teece, 1986), such as 
commercial networks. Network orchestration and the socially-tied controlled networks, in the 
                                                          
3 Following Teece (1986) we refer to the non-generic ones, that is, specialized or co-specialized ones, referring 






case of MIDs may act as specialized complementary assets favouring the incumbents and 
constraining new firms from new industries.  
The role and performance of incumbents facing radical innovation, therefore, is determined by 
their specialized complementary assets: whether they are necessary or not for the new 
knowledge to be applied. Hence, complementary assets are an advantage of incumbents over 
newcomers (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). In MIDs the socio-economic cooperation and 
competition with other actors in a social and trust-based relationship confers advantages to 
leading incumbents, counteracting newcomers’ access to those networks. The reason is based 
on the fact that leading firms orchestrate those networks of small firms.  In MIDs, therefore, 
these leading firms are more interested in the creation of less disruptive technology-related 
knowledge (Glasmeier, 1991). Thus, the prominence of trust-based relationships, values, 
reciprocity and informal norms fuelled by the intense existent social capital articulated in 
formal and informal networks (Becattini, 1990; Saxenian, 1994) make the orchestration of local 
networks one of the most important institutions in MIDs and also one of the key incumbents’ 
specialized complementary assets that prevent newcomers from accessing MIDs. Therefore, 
new firms participating in the creative destruction process need to access those local networks 
through leading local firms that orchestrate them. Our argumentation is based on the idea that 
the diffusion of radical innovations in MIDS requires accessing those established networks, 
shaped by trust, norms of cooperation, common language and shared beliefs that facilitate 
communication (e.g. Becattini, 1990). Thus, cooperation or partnerships between incumbents 
and newcomers or district outsiders are vital so that radical innovation occurs, due to the 
overwhelming role played by local networks. Both incumbents and new (district outsiders) 
firms seek each other’s specialized complementary assets: while incumbents want to access the 
new technology-distant knowledge in order to recombine their capabilities, newcomers need 
to access existing networks to diffuse their new paradigms. This mutual interest may even 
foster alliances (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) between newcomers and the local networks in 
MIDs.  
 
2.3 Syntheses of expectations. 
To sum up, after intersecting MID and radical innovation perspectives, we argue that for radical 
innovation to occur in MIDs often implies the creation or adoption of technology-distant (to 





a fact already stated (see Russo, 1996; 1998; Gabaldon-Estevan, 2016). Creative destruction or 
radical innovation, however, is usually constrained from local firms’ cognitive inertia and lock-
in and especially from the pressure by leading firms that orchestrate local networks and see 
new disruptions as a threat to their centrality. MID rejuvenation through the creation of 
adoption of new radical knowledge also requires new (to the district) firms renewing networks. 
As these new firms need to access local networks, given the fact that strongly-tied local 
networks act as leading incumbents’ specialized complementary assets, the cooperation or 
partnerships between leading incumbents and newcomers is also expected. Table 1 summarizes 
points. See table 1.  
Insert table 1 here 
3- Research setting: Castellon and Sassuolo MIDs in Europe 
The Castellon (Valencia Region, Spain) ceramic tiles ID is a typical Marshallian industrial 
district (Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009; 2008; 2007), well endowed with world-
class public R&D and educational organisations, all of which are focused on ceramic tiles (see 
Belussi and Hervas-Oliver, 20017; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2017; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011)4.  It 
includes all the activities necessary for the ceramics value chain: clay processing, ceramic tile 
production, frit and glaze decoration based on high-tech chemistry and ceramic equipment 
production and services such as logistics, design, and other related activities. It is significant to 
state that the industries in the ID providing key knowledge and innovation are the frit and glaze 
(chemistry for tile surface decoration) and the ceramic equipment manufacturers (kilns, 
production lines, presses, etc.), following a supplier-driven innovation pattern in the sense of 
Pavit (1984).  
In addition, along with Castellon, Italy also has one of the largest ceramic tile industries in the 
world. Around 80% of Italy’s ceramic tile production is concentrated in the Emilia–Romagna 
region, around Sassuolo district, deeply embedded in the Emilia-Romagna regional innovation 
system, containing a strong ceramic tile equipment manufacturing sector. Both IDs (Castellon 
and Sassuolo) are mentioned in Porter’s (1990) seminal contribution5. These machine 
manufacturing firms lead the ceramic tile equipment world and are present in Castellon as 
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see www.ascer.es (industry statistics) 
5 The agglomeration indices for the Castellon and Sassuolo ceramic tiles industries are reported to be around 4.5 (450%) in 






subsidiaries. Similarly, the Spanish (chemical) frit and glaze industry is the most powerful 
auxiliary industry in the Castellon cluster and is the absolute world leader6 in the frit and glaze 
activity for tiles, having extensive operations in other clusters worldwide, including Sassuolo. 
Both IDs form a network of clusters, channeling information back and forth through their 
multinational companies in their respective industries co-located in both IDs (Meyer-Stamer et 
al., 2004; Hervas-Oliver and Boix, 2013) and making the best world-leader inter-cluster 
connection for ceramic tile innovation. 
4- Methods and data sources 
For our research we have used the approach of a case study, a key instrument for capturing 
complex information (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989), with secondary data analysis being utilised 
alongside in-depth semi-structured interviews in order to decipher how and why radical change 
occurred.  
Our focus and unit of analysis is on district firms that were involved in the disruption that took 
place in the tile industry. We identified all active firms from rosters provided by industry 
associations in both districts. In all, more than 300 firms in the two IDs were explored for their 
relationship with the new technology inception and adoption, selecting those which directly 
took part. As a robustness check, we also tracked all patents related to the new event. Interviews 
(62 respondents) were conducted over the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. In the first round 
(2011 and 2012), 50 interviewed respondents included the inventors, competitors and the 
subsequent adopters of the new technology in Castellon.  
 
5- Data analysis 
5-1 Radical innovation: inkjet printing tile decoration technology in Castellon 
5.1.1 Overall explanation of the disruption 
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Our focus is the analysis of ceramic tile decoration, which dramatically changed from a 
mechanical process to a digital inkjet-based one, constituting a radical innovation that made 
the existing tile decoration process obsolete in view of the new digital decoration process. To 
summarize, ceramic tile production is composed of three main activities: tile production (using 
clay, processes and equipment), tile decoration (designing and coloring tile surfaces) and the 
baking process (in the kiln). It was a process of creative destruction that incorporated new 
radical knowledge and technology (digital inkjet-based knowledge into ceramic tile decoration) 
that existing value of incumbents in that particular activity (tile decoration) was destroyed, 
affecting all parts of the value chain (machinery, chemical and production process). Disruption 
occurred in the tile decoration process by (i) replacing traditional mechanical decoration 
processes and equipment by digital (computer-assisted inkjet, based on images and files and 
not in chemical formulas and color combinations) ones and, (ii) replacing traditional frits and 
glazes (chemical compounds to color and decorate tiles) by new inks (new frits suitable for the 
digital processes with the new head printers, based on the inkjet system). This radical inkjet 
innovation was led and orchestrated by Castellon firms that eventually overcame inertia and 
shift, leapfrogging their Italian counterparts, who suffered a severe inertia process. In Appendix 
I, additional information in order to fully understand the case is provided. See Appendix I. For 
the sake of clarity, our core research question is: how does radical innovation occur in MIDs?  
5.1.2 Technology-distant new knowledge and new firms entering the tile industry 
In 1994, the leading incumbent System from Sassuolo introduced the Rotocolor technology7 as 
the new dominant design in Castellon and Sassuolo, functioning as a mechanical process 
spreading (chemical) frits and colors onto the ceramic tiles by rolling on their surface. Later 
on, in 1998, a new local Castellon equipment firm, Kerajet, began exploring new possibilities 
to decorate ceramic tiles based on digital technologies that would ultimately substitute 
Rotocolor gradually from 2006. The entrepreneurs at Kerajet, all of them with extensive 
experience in the industry, challenged the entire industry and dreamed of a digitized process in 
order to decorate tiles by inkjet printing, as was being done in other industries such as graphic 
design. The necessary knowledge was not available in Castellon nor in Sassuolo. The CEO 
from Kerajet reported: (clarifications in brackets):  
                                                          
7 This technology decorates ceramic tiles by means of engraved silicon cylinders which reproduce high definition images, 





“We knew exactly what we were looking for....and the solution was not part of  traditional ceramics knowledge 
among  people in the (Castellon) ID...nor among the Italians [Sassuolo ID]. For this reason, we visited the 
Cambridge printing cluster [Xaar] and also Japan [Seiko], searching for printing technology...Such distant [to 
ceramics] knowledge proved to be good, but insufficient. Micro-milling processes were also necessary, from other 
industries, along with other different technologies…... ” 
Kerajet was searching for knowledge outside the ID and throughout many industries, meeting 
the firm Xaar, located in the (UK) Cambridge inkjet printing cluster. In 1998 they co-developed 
a first prototype based on inkjet printing, their main aim being to digitize the decoration process 
for ceramic tiles. So far, the decoration process was dominated by the Sassuolo mechanical 
process (Rotocolor). The advantage for the new firm, Kerajet, was that it was located in 
Castellon, far away from the cognitive mechanical framework existent in Sassuolo and better 
supported by the world-class chemical decoration process available in Castellon. The new 
technology involved a dramatic change in the knowledge base, moving from mechanistic 
decoration to digital inkjet (printing) decoration, pioneering a radical innovation. See 
Tortajada-Esparza et al., (2008b) to learn more. The main problems, however, were (i) 
transferring that new digital knowledge to the tile industry and, (ii) convincing an entire MID 
to abandon the existent decoration process based on mechanical Rotocolor (fully efficient and 
known). New firms entering the industry, or at least trying to at that time, were those from the 
inkjet industry, offering the new tech to be adapted to the ceramic tile process.  
 
5.1.3 Cognitive inertia: reluctance to change and the power of leading incumbents 
The new technology was not ready to be used and the tile producers were very comfortable 
receiving technical assistance on the existent (Rotocolor-based) decoration process from the 
powerful Castellon-based leading chemical incumbents. Nobody was eager to change and the 
leading Castellon chemical and the Sassuolo mechanical firms were both constraining the 
development of the new technology by not recommending change to tile producers. The 
powerful influence that those leading firms exerted on those networks of small tile producers, 
the latter receiving innovation and technical support from those leading firms, made change in 
Castellon almost impossible. Meanwhile, in Sassuolo, nobody was aware of or interested in 
that nascent technology from Castellon, as it radically confronted Sassuolo’s established 
paradigm concerning the mechanical decoration process. 





“…the new technology included new machinery, new inks (substituting frits) and new processes….but the most 
problematic thing was to change our production processes well established around large batches, traditional 
(non-digitized) design….We had in stock more than 7,000 references for colours to be blended…..and now with 
only four colours (based on CMYC, four-color printing, based on cyan, magenta, yellow and black combinations) 
the job is done by the computer….and the decorating personnel was old and not used to working with 
computers…..At that time none of us wanted that change…..At the present moment we know how good this new 
technology is ….” 
The main problem was not to develop the new technology but to convince all firms in the 
Castellon MID to change and overcome the established status quo or cognitive inertia 
concerning the Rotocolor established paradigm.  As the CEO at Kerajet reported,  
“….technology adoption was crucial and problematic…..the ceramic tile producers incorporate knowledge and 
innovation from leading frit and equipment companies……networks in the cluster are really closed and tied 
around leading firms and we knew that the leading established companies were the key to opening the 
market….but they were all reluctant…except Ferro which was allowing us to test the prototype with some of its 
key customers…..”.  
As one manager from a leading chemical firm asserted:  
“We were all reluctant to take on something new which could cannibalize our own products, no matter how good 
it was. At that time it was risky to shift focus towards a new thing which in turn could be oppose our interests…”. 
During the first three years, the district was reluctant to adopt the new technology, which was 
far from ready to fully substitute the dominant Rotocolor. Even though the new inkjet 
application (software, print heads and equipment) was developed, the new issue became the 
chemical compounds (frits) products, which were not optimized. Traditional chemical 
decoration (frits) for Rotocolor did not work with the new digital technology. In short, at that 
time (2001-2004) two major problems constrained the release of the new technology: one was 
the collective reluctance to change, led and reinforced by leading incumbents; and the other 
one was the lack of proper chemical decoration frits for the new technology. In addition, new 
firms entering the Castellon cluster with digital (inkjet) technology to facilitate the transition 
could not access the local networks, as the latter were orchestrated by local leading chemical 
firms from Castellon, based on extensive trust and social ties.  
As managers of ceramic tile firms manifested:  
“Personal ties are more important than formal inter-firm agreements….my friends mostly work for the industry 
and we regularly meet for a meal…of course we share issues…you have to live and socialize here to keep 
learning…..In general, most ceramic tile firms do exactly what their key suppliers [frits and equipment firms] 
advise them to do, because the latter are the ones supplying innovation, support and knowledge” 
“Some of my rivals’ managers are also my friends and we were all trained in the same school…It does not mean 
we share everything….but we respect each other’s views and opinions about current affairs….None of them 





printing] we were all interested in the new technology. Yes, our suppliers [frits firms] started trial and error with 
some of us, suggesting that the new technology looked interesting…not all of them suggested change, only two of 
them in 2005-06 [Ferro and Torrecid]…the rest came later……”.  
All in all, we identified a collective (inertia) reluctance to adoption, orchestrated by leading 
chemical and equipment companies controlling networks of tile producers that restricted the 
entrance of technology-distant (to the district and to the industry) knowledge (from the printing 
digital industry) and; new entrants, mostly from the inkjet industry (e.g. Xaar, Seiko) 
threatening the rules of the game and the current paradigm established in the Castellon ID, 
although they could not access those local networks.  
Meanwhile, in Italy no company was participating in the development of the new technology 
for inkjet tile decoration. The reason was based on the prevailing mechanical cognitive 
framework for producing tiles and the fact that leading equipment firms were reluctant to 
diffuse that knowledge to their local networks around Sassuolo. The latter is explained by the 
fact that radical innovation could render leading tile equipment firms’ knowledge obsolete, as 
it directly confronted the well-established (equipment, processes, jobs, etc.) mechanical 
paradigm. In part, this explains Sassuolo’s late adoption of inkjet.   
5.1.4 New firms and leading incumbents’ alliances 
Around 2003-04 the leading chemical firms in Castellon understood their key position in the 
new situation: they were controlling the networks of local ceramic tile producers, deciding 
whether or not to advise switching and thus blocking technology shift; additionally, leading 
chemical firms were the ones with enough technical capabilities and investment capability to 
pursue the development of the necessary new inks for the new digital technology. That power 
and control of networks is perfectly described at Tortajada-Esparza et al., (2008ab; 2009).  
Three leading frits incumbents from Castellon (named Ferro, Esmalglass and Torrecid) started 
a race in order to secure the inks for the new technology, in an attempt to seek prominence and 
maintain their status quo in a potentially possible new dominant design post-Rotocolor, forging 
alliances with new firms focused on digital inkjet technology in order to combine capabilities 
and develop inkjet for tiles:  Ferro was the first firm to support Kerajet; Esmalglass established 
a co-operation agreement for inkjet development with Xennia in the Cambridge cluster (a 
spinoff spawned by Xaar, the provider of the print heads for Kerajet); while Torrecid, another 





the five most powerful frit incumbents (absolute world leaders8) struggled to lead the new frits 
development of the new technology. In 2005 the new organic pigmented inks and the inkjet 
technology became fully established and accepted, a chemical innovation that all three 
incumbents found simultaneously9. This opened the way for the inkjet to be fully applied in the 
MID.  All in all, from 2006 Castellon began to transfer to the new tech led by powerful local 
Castellon chemical firms. Those three leading firms turned from rejection to encouragement to 
shift, orchestrating local networks to the new technology paradigm.  
5.1.5 Sassuolo cluster reluctance to transfer: why? 
Why was the innovation diffusion uneven in both intertwined MIDs, Castellon and Sassuolo? 
Why was Sassuolo MID a laggard in the transition toward the new digital decoration? 
Following our findings, the reason was based on the persistent reluctance to change caused by  
the prevailing and dominant mechanical cognitive framework for producing tiles existent in 
Sassuolo, fuelled by the powerful and leading equipment firms that understood the change as 
a threat and a potential loss of local networks’ control and orchestration. Additionally,  the lack 
of decoration tile technology existent in Sassuolo, heavily dependent on the Castellon firms 
that were first and foremost more oriented to advising transition to their Castellon local 
networks that are their natural living lab. As an R&D manager in a leading frit company 
reported (clarifications in brackets): 
“…the problem for the Italians (Sassuolo) in this case was that the new paradigm was heavily dependent on 
decoration based on new frits (inks) and that knowledge was only available in Castellon […] and System and the 
rest (Barbieri, Sacmi, among others) are heavily present here (Castellon) but their R&D facilities are in the Italian 
cluster….; there is no doubt that if the new technology had been based on mechanical technologies, instead of 
decoration,  we would have been followers….”. 
During the early years (2000-05), Kerajet, the pioneer firm, dominated the market completely 
with printer sales going to leading customers on a trial and error basis. Meanwhile, System, the 
Rotocolor manufacturer, was so constrained by its own technology that it kept developing the 
Rotocolor technology along with the new inkjet technology, producing a kind of “hybrid 
technology” (mixing both Rotocolor and digital) which consumed most of its R&D resources, 
failed and led to engaging ultimately with Kerajet as a licensee of the inkjet printing 
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of frits and glaze for the ceramic tile industry. Interviews and Tortajada-Esparaza et al., 2008ab; 2009 





technology. SACMI, another leading equipment company from Sassuolo did the same. As 
revealed during interviews by the frit trade association board (ANFFECC, June 2012):  
“….System was incapable of fighting this battle […] all its commitments, networks and technologies had been 
embedded in the mechanical rolling decoration technology since the launch of the Rocket version in the 1970s 
[…] they were developing new Rotocolor-based versions of inkjet printing which did not work…..”. 
 
Patent analysis, see Appendix II for technical details, also supports the first factor about the 
cognitive inertia in Sassulo firms due to their mechanical architectural knowledge. Leading 
incumbents from Sassuolo, a cluster deeply embedded in its extraordinary mechanical capacity 
confirmed in the interviews and as evidenced in the patent analysis, was unable to escape from 
past paradigms: both firms had their manufacturing facilities and R&D labs in Sassuolo, albeit 
both had affiliates for selling products (not manufacturing) in Castellon. They ended up 
entering as latecomers and their proportion of inkjet decoration capabilities market share is 
residual with 2016 data. Their embedded mechanical knowledge was a core rigidity that 
prevented transition.  
Summing up, in the Italian case, patents were hybrid versions (System and Sacmi) of the 
Rotocolor or just latecomers (e.g. Projecta): lock-in was pervasive.  In this specific case of 
Sassuolo, a pervasive process of inertia or resistance to abandoning old technologies was 
observed, corroborating past studies (e.g. Glasmeier, 1991; Grabher, 1993; Sull, 2001).  
 
5.1.6 Concluding the case. 
Overall, findings confirmed that the new tile inkjet technology is entirely a Castellon produced 
technology, without Italian participation, adapting inkjet technology from the Cambridge 
printing cluster (Xaar, Xennia, etc.) or Seiko (Japan) to the specific case of tile decoration using 
inkjet. The technology was adapted to the tile process by local Castellon firms (Kerajet and the 
leading chemical companies). The adaptation and full adoption was possible in Castellon 
because that MID was fully embedded in tile decoration and the powerful leading chemical 
firms facilitated the new inks and fostered the transition after a first period of reluctance and 
inertia.  
Overall, Castellon had the necessary ecosystem for advancing the decoration process and 
turning it from a mechanical (Italian equipment based) into a digital one. Then, the main 
difference between Castellon and Sassuolo was based on the fact that the former is highly 





strengths concerning tile decoration technology include a world-class research transfer office 
fully devoted to tile decoration with over 100 researchers (ITC), along with the presence of all 
leading chemical firms for tile decoration, all indigenous to Castellon with their R&D labs 
located there, and the local university (UJI) offering industrial engineering with focus on tile 
decoration; all this ecosystem of innovation was the seedbed for tile decoration disruption, 
combining decoration processes with the new inkjet technology. In Sassuolo, decoration is led 
by the Castellon firms and the MID is entirely devoted to tile production based exclusively on 
mechanical knowledge based, far from the decoration emphasis from Castellon. Thus, the 
cognitive inertia in Sassuolo was more difficult to overcome.  
Also, it is important to remark that the new inkjet technology provided significant productivity 
improvements shown in Appendix III. For the sake of clarity, a time diagram is also provided 
in Appendix IV.  
Regarding the Cambridge and Castellon co-operation, mixing inkjet printing and tile 
decoration, the unexpected results were impressive. First, the inter-industry co-operation 
brought radical discontinuities to both sides, opening up new possibilities. Thus, Cambridge 
firms accessed the most powerful innovation center for tiles, Castellon, using it as a 
springboard for new markets in the global ceramic tile industry, which were very promising 
and profitable in Europe and Asia (China, India, Indonesia, etc.) and Latin America (Brazil or 
Mexico). Second, subsequently, companies from Silicon Valley (e.g. EFI), like those from 
Cambridge, have also established a foothold in Castellon, opening up new markets and 
technology for both sides, yielding unexpected positive returns and rejuvenating MIDs. 
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